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A Wittgensteinian Defense of Cultural Relativism

Emily Heckel
Introduction
Cultural relativism is an integral part of the field
methodology for cultural anthropologists. The concept of
cultural relativism grew from developments within the
philosophy of language, particularly associated with figures
such as Wittgenstein, Quine, Whorf, and Sapir. These
philosophers all argue for some version of the concept that
linguistic categories, encoded in thought, help create the
shared cultural realities in which we live. This concept of
linguistic relativism, famously articulated in the SapirWhorf hypothesis1, led to an emphasis in anthropology on
the emic, or insider’s, perspective. Ethnography is the
process of eliciting the meanings by which the host culture
constructs reality and translating these into the discourse of
the discipline in a final written product. Steven Pinker, along
with other evolutionary psychologists and cognitive
scientists, refers to any and all versions of this view as the
Standard Social Science Model2 allowing him to defeat
cultural relativism in one fell swoop (or so he thinks). Until
a few years ago, the main critique of the ethnographic
method came from the postmodern critique of science,
1

Benjamin Whorf, “Science and Linguistics,” Technology Review, 42
(1940): 247-248.
2
Steven Pinker, The Language Instinct (New York: W. Morrow and
Co., 1994), 23.
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which questions objectivity in the social sciences on both
ethical and epistemological grounds. Recently, the critique
of cultural relativism has come from evolutionary
psychologists and anthropologists. Research in cognitive
science and psychology points to an evolutionary cause for
what has previously been deemed cultural behavior. Some,
including Steven Pinker, believe that this research should
lead us to give primacy to evolutionary causes and should
undermine any version of cultural relativism.
Steven Pinker, an evolutionary psychologist, presents
an important challenge to the relativist views of language
and meaning that pervade cultural anthropology. Advances
in evolutionary psychology and the mind sciences provide
evidence for biological commonalities in humans that extend
to commonalities in our linguistic abilities and thought
processes. Pinker argues that language is different from
other aspects of so-called cultural behavior because it is
innate or instinctual. Children become advanced
grammarians without formal instruction, demonstrating an
ability to apply rules beyond their ability to articulate such
rules. This happens universally in the same way, as Pinker
puts it, that children learn to walk upright instead of crawl
around on all fours.3
Pinker argues that the universality of language
entails universality in cognition. “People do not think in
English or Chinese or Apache,” he says; “they think in a
language of thought.”4 This language, which Pinker calls
mentalese, may resemble all of these languages but it is
probably richer than some and simpler than others.5 If
cognition is shaped by a language of thought, then it is a
3
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biological property of all human beings, much the same as
walking upright. Pinker is positing a language that is held
prior to learned languages by all human beings and it is this
innate language that shapes our cognition. If cognition is
shaped not by the languages we know but by a universal
language of thought, then relativism is undermined and this
could have serious implications for anthropological theory
and methodology.
Does the universality of language seriously
undermine the Standard Social Science Model as Pinker
claims? I argue that the evolutionary view of cognition is not
necessarily incompatible with relativist views of meaning
and values. Rather than take the Standard Social Science
Model as one theory, as Pinker does, I will focus on
Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language and culture.
Wittgenstein’s position represents a more nuanced relativism
that can account for aspects of Pinker’s language instinct
while still arguing for some degree of cultural relativism. In
the first section, I discuss the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis as a
basis for cultural relativism before outlining the challenges
that Pinker presents to relativism and cultural anthropology.
I will then discuss Wittgenstein’s involvment in
anthropology through the works of Stanley Cavell and
anthropologist Veena Das and attempt a Wittgensteinian
defense of cultural relativism.
Cultural Relativism
The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is the basis for linguistic
relativism as it is used in anthropology. Linguistic relativism
has many different meanings and levels of interpretation. To
understand this, I will return to the primary source that best
sums up the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Benjamin Whorf’s
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article “Science and Linguistics” examines the way that
language affects thought and how the structure of language
affects cognition. Whorf is critical of natural logic, which
states that language depends on laws of reason and logic that
are the same for everyone and exist independently of us.6
This implies that any language can express the same
thought, because all languages are essentially extensions of
reasoning and logic7. Whorf proposes that, rather than
describe universal systems of reasoning, language actually
creates these systems and, in doing so, actually shapes our
experience of the world.
Whorf begins with a thought experiment in which we
imagine a world of people who only had the psychological
ability to see the color blue.8 Since they have never seen any
other color, the concept of different colors to these people
would be meaningless. The only way for the category of
color to have any meaning for them would be if they had
“exceptional moments”9 of seeing other colors. This thought
experiment show the fallacies that Whorf sees in natural
logic. First, language is a part of the background and not the
“critical consciousness”10 of the speaker, and is therefore
like the color blue in the example. When we talk about logic,
we naturally use concepts, grammar, and rules from our own
language. We do not question these laws because we have
not consciously compared them to any others. Second,
discussions of natural logic normally occur between
speakers of the same language. “Two speakers of English,”
6
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Whorf explains, “quickly reach a point of assent about the
subject matter of their speech; they agree about what their
language refers to.”11 It is not necessary for them to
understand the linguistic processes that occur beneath the
surface in order to agree on the rules that they share by
virtue of both being speakers of English.
Whorf believes that the linguist is in a privileged
position to study these phenomena and to expand their “base
of reference”12. It was the study of multiple languages and
patterns that lead Whorf to look at a linguistic system as
“not merely a reproducing instrument for voicing ideas but
rather… a shaper of ideas” 13. We all live in the same world,
but we “dissect nature along lines laid down by our native
languages”14. This idea has many implications for the
objectivism of modern science, because it implies that
individuals are not free to come up with their own thoughts
about the world, but that their thoughts are shaped by the
linguistic world in which they live (5). This affects every
speaker of a language and leaves no one impartial, though
Whorf argues that the most impartial would be the linguist
who was familiar with many different linguistic systems.
Whorf uses examples from his study of the Hopi language to
show that the worldviews in English and Hopi are very
different.
The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, developed through
Whorf’s article and through subsequent publications and
influenced by his advisor, Edward Sapir, is a two-fold
argument. First, humans are only able to think about objects,
processes, and conditions that have language associated with
11
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them, which is what Whorf is getting at with his thought
experiment of people who only see the color blue. This is
called linguistic determinism. The other part of the SapirWhorf hypothesis, linguistic relativity, states that culture is
largely determined by language, as evidence by the
relationship between language and thought. Linguists and
cultural anthropologists usually support a strong or weak
interpretation of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. It is generally
regarded as having some truth, but it presents some
difficulties, as it is hard to completely support or refute it.
Still, it has been a highly influential theory, particularly in
the field of anthropology where it was lead to the
development of methods in field research that emphasize
cognitive categories in the brain that are unique to a
particular culture and can be discovered through language.
The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis in many ways
revolutionized ways of thinking about language and
categories, particularly for the social sciences. It has also
been a very controversial idea. In recent years, research in
the cognitive sciences has lead linguists, psychologists, and
philosophers to explore the possibility of a universal
language, implying that concepts and categories are shared
cross-culturally. The argument that there is a universal
language of thought, “mentalese,” that transcends different
languages seems to be the antithesis of the Sapir-Whorf
hypothesis, and there are some philosophers who
vehemently argue against linguistic relativism based on this
idea. I would like to explore the question of whether or not
these two views about language and meaning are mutually
opposed and irreconcilable. I will now turn to Pinker to
present an evolutionary psychologist’s challenge to cultural
relativism.

11

Pinker’s Challenge
In The Language Instinct, Pinker lays out a
revolutionary way of looking at language as an evolutionary
mechanism. Pinker begins with Chomsky’s observation that
children develop complex grammars without formal
instruction and grow up with the ability to interpret
sentences that they have never heard before.15 Pinker and
Chomsky would both agree that children are innately
equipped with a Universal Grammar16 that allows them to
apply complex syntactic patterns from the speech of their
parents. Pinker says, “complex language is universal
because children actually reinvent it, generation after
generation.”17 “… A three-year-old,” he says, “…is a
grammatical genius, but is quite incompetent at the visual
arts, religious iconography, traffic signs, and other staples of
the semiotics curriculum.”18
According to Pinker, language is separate from what
is commonly considered by anthropologists to be culturally
learned behavior. In fact, Pinker argues that language is
actually better explained in terms of evolution than in terms
of culture. He says, “Language is no more a cultural
invention than is upright posture.”19 Cultural anthropologists
argue that language encodes cultural symbols and shapes the
thoughts of an individual within a given cultural context. If
language can be explained in terms of evolutionary
15
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behavior, as Pinker claims, then certain aspects of
anthropological methodology are undermined.
Not only is language an evolutionary mechanism, but
it is an evolutionary mechanism with a specific function:
communication. Pinker argues, “Once you begin to look at
language not as the ineffable essence of human uniqueness
but as a biological adaptation to communicate information, it
is no longer as tempting to see language as an insidious
shaper of thought, and, we shall see, it is not.20
If language is supposed to communicate information
that is contained within one’s thoughts, then it follows that
learned language (such as English or Japanese) cannot shape
our thoughts, but it is mentalese that shapes language. Pinker
says that mentalese “has symbols for concepts, and
arrangements of symbols that correspond to who did what to
whom.”21 I should note that mentalese not only operates
according to a Universal Grammar, but that Pinker extends
this to lexicon as well. We are able to communicate because
our thoughts operate under a universal arrangement of
symbols that is encoded in the mind of every language
learner. Since language is just the means to the end of
communication, Pinker asks why would language be so
subjective?
In his chapter “Mentalese,” Pinker argues against the
linguistic relativism proposed by the Sapir-Whorf
hypothesis. He even goes so far as to say that linguistic
relativity is an example of what he calls “conventional
absurdity: a statement that goes against all common sense
but that everyone believes because they dimly recall having
heard it somewhere.”22 Obviously there are reasons to
20
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critique Pinker’s unsympathetic portrayal of the Sapir-Whorf
hypothesis, but first I would like to show why Pinker is so
dismissive of this view. Pinker believes that people do not
think in any particular language, but that they think in a
“language of thought.”
Knowing a language, according to Pinker is
“knowing how to translate mentalese into strings of words
and vice versa.”23 This is a radically different view from
linguistic relativism in that it posits a stage in language
acquisition and speech that is at a level of symbolism and
has nothing to do with the categories specific to any one
language or culture. Mentalese is simpler than some aspects
of language and more complex than others. Pinker describes
how language is ambiguous, for example in newspaper
headlines, but we are still able to interpret the correct
meaning.24 For example, in the headline “Drunk Gets Nine
Months in Violin Case,”25 most readers would understand
that the word “case” does not refer to the case in which one
keeps a violin. This illustrates one of the differences
between mentalese and language; in English, “case” can
have multiple meanings, whereas in mentalese, each
meaning will constitute a different symbol.
Overall, Pinker presents some important challenges
to linguistic relativism. He questions how relativism can
account for our ability to translate one learned language into
another, for the universality of language acquisition, and for
the connection between language and biological universals
that he observes through viewing language as an
evolutionary mechanism . I find his arguments about
mentalese to be convincing. Pinker argues that children have
23
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their own mentalese that allows for them to acquire
increasingly complicated language and eventually develop
more advanced mentalese as well. This is necessary, Pinker
says, for language acquisition. How can linguistic relativism
account for the fact that we are thinking about the world
before we learn a language and during the learning process?
How can children connect language with thought and
meaning if thoughts are completely shaped by language?
These are very real worries for linguistic relativism, at any
level of moderation. By extension, they should be a concern
for any field in which linguistic relativism is important, such
as anthropology.
In the last chapter “Mind Design” Pinker discusses
some philosophical implications of the universality of the
language instinct and his theory of mentalese. It is clear that
he is completely opposed to anything resembling the SapirWhorf hypothesis, because this goes against the goal of
further researching biological and evolutionary universals
about human nature and the mind that have been discovered.
Pinker quotes philosopher and experimental psycholinguist
Jerry Fodor, “I hate relativism,” he says at one point, “I hate
relativism more than I hate anything else.”26 I believe that it
is a mistake for Pinker to dismiss this viewpoint so
vehemently. Does this merely illustrate that there is a
polarizing divide in the philosophical community over
language and thought? Is there any room for reconciling the
two viewpoints, or of moderating them?
I will now turn to Wittgenstein and his relationship
to anthropology to present a more nuanced view of cultural
relativism. Though my defense of relativism could be

26
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applied more generally, I believe that the Wittgensteinian
view is especially useful in that it can accommodate a
certain naturalism or empiricism that not all forms of
relativism can contain.
Wittgenstein and Anthropology
Primarily a philosopher of language, mathematics,
and logic, Wittgenstein was both influenced by and
influenced anthropology. For example, it was negative
reaction to Frazer’s Golden Bough that led Wittenstein to
reexamine his views about culture and language.
Wittgenstein finds Frazer’s explanation of magic and
religion as “mistakes” to be highly unsatisfactory. In his
Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough27, we can discern the
outlines of his later views as presented in the Philosophical
Investigations28. In general, Wittgenstein is critical of Frazer
for judging the behavior of people in other cultures by his
own societal standards. He says, “It never does seem
plausible that people do all this out of sheer stupidity.”29
Wittgenstein is particularly critical of Frazer for
saying that magic and ritual are merely “false physics”30. He
says, “What makes the character of ritual action is not any
view or opinion, either right or wrong, although an opinion –

27

Ludwig Wittgenstein, “Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough” (Trans.
A.C. Miles.
Norfolk: Brynmill Press Ltd, 1979), 2.
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Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (New York:
Macmillan, 1958).
29
Ludwig Wittgenstein, “Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough,” (Trans.
A.C. Miles. Norfolk: Brynmill Press Ltd, 1979), 1.
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a belief – itself can be ritualistic, or belong to a rite.”31
Wittgenstein compares the rituals that Frazer describes with
rituals that he sees in his own culture; for example, breaking
a bottle on a boat before sailing for good luck32. In
comparing the rituals of one culture to those of his own,
Wittgenstein shows that we within the multiplicity of
language games in our own culture, we can see parallels
across cultures. It would be inaccurate to equate the
magician in one culture with the scientist in our own. It is
more accurate to draw a parallel between a magician and a
priest, or between two different folk beliefs. Wittgenstein
says about studying other cultures, “We can only describe
and say human life is like that,”33 implying that we should
not attempt to look for explanations. However, he seems
open to the idea that we can use language games with which
we are familiar in order to understand similar language
games in other cultures. This puts him in an interesting
position of arguing against explanation, but with some
openness to the possibility of understanding.
In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein further
develops this idea of language and behavior, which will
influence anthropologists in the future. He famously
compares a language system with a game.34 Wittgenstein
argues that the rules of a “language game” are learned
through practice, rather than seeking meaning through a
comparison with some non-linguistic reality, and people
follow different linguistic rules depending on what language
game they are participating in at the time. When
31

Ibid, 7.
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Wittgenstein says that it is a mistake to compare the magic
of culture to the science of another, he seems to be equating
a language game with the linguistic aspect of a culture. He
says, “What we have in ancient rites is the practice of a
highly cultivated gesture-game.”35 Wittgenstein does not
ignore the possibility of biological commonalities between
people, as we can see in his arguments about pain and
crying, nor does he deny the instinctual ability of humans to
acquire language. The very ability to distinguish between the
discourse of magic and science implies that there must be
aspects of both in our own culture. In trying to describe any
universality and give it meaning, however, we run into a
problem: It is impossible to give something value, meaning,
or truth outside of a given system or language game.
Stanley Cavell, who writes about Wittgenstein as a
philosopher of culture, focuses on Wittgenstein’s idea of
forms of life. Cavell suggests that in applying Wittgenstein
as a philosopher of culture, we distinguish between an
ethnological or horizontal form of life and a vertical or
“biological sense”.36 The “ethnological” form of life is
related to our interaction in a cultural context, through words
and other behavior, as participants in language games. The
“biological sense” of forms of life relates to universal nonlinguistic aspects of life, including our naturally given
behavior and responses. The two senses of forms of life that
Cavell posits are, of course, connected. Wittgenstein’s
concept of pain includes the natural behaviors related to
crying. Though perhaps Wittgenstein himself would not talk
35

Ludwig Wittgenstein, “Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough,” (Trans.
A.C. Miles. Norfolk: Brynmill Press Ltd, 1979), 10.
36
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about these two separately, I have relied on Cavell’s
distinction for this paper in order to emphasize that
Wittgenstein posits a view that accounts for both universal,
natural aspects of human life as well as subjective
interpretations of this form of life through the shared
language games in which we participate.
Anthropologist Veena Das points out that given the
“certain air of obviousness with which notions of the
everyday and voice are often spoken of in anthropological
writing, I have been amazed at how difficult I found it to
speak of these matters.”37 Das relates this idea of finding
meaning in the everyday with Wittgenstein’s skepticism.
Though Das does not endorse objectivity, her skepticism of
the everyday and her awareness of the self-imposed
boundaries of context and subjectivity offer a point from
which to look closely at the world around her from a
perspective that, if not objective, is grounded in something
natural – the boundaries of being a subjective agent.
In studying a culture that has been affected by
extreme and sudden violence and pain, Das observes a
breakdown in the relationship between the forms of life
surrounding her and the language game in which they
previously were engaged in. She herself, like most of us, has
not participated in these forms of life and a new language
must be developed to speak of this. Because of the
inextricable connection between pain and language, it is
impossible for Das as an anthropologists to fully understand
what her informants have experienced. However, it is
through this lack of understanding that she finds a point
from which to study. The point from which Das studies is
37
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completely different from the perspective of someone like
Pinker, who studies objective symbolic categories. Das does
not attempt to study at that level of analysis; instead, she
acknowledges her inability to explain the behavior of others,
and settles for a limited understanding.
I plan to come to the defense of the Wittgensteinian
perspective as it manifests itself in anthropology,
specifically through the work of Veena Das and Stanley
Cavell. Although Wittgenstein is sometimes dismissed by
linguists on the grounds that he writes before the
Chomskyan revolution, Das has taken Wittgenstein’s ideas
and applied them to her current work. Her book Life and
Words38 details her theories and methods, as well as some
ethnographic chapters, that uses Wittgenstein’s ideas about
language, pain, and privacy. It seems that Wittgenstein’s
project of bringing language back to the everyday is still
relevant.
Wittgensteinian Defense
In the previous section, I have outline Wittgenstein
as a philosopher of culture and shown that he is a relativist
with naturalist leanings. Wittgenstein’s cultural relativism, it
seems, can still account for biological commonalities. In
fact, even the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, which is often taken
as an extremely relativist position, does not have to deny the
existence of a natural world independent of human
discourse. In “Science and Linguisics,” Whorf says, “We all
live in the same world, but we “dissect nature along lines

38
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laid down by our native languages.”39 I assume that in
“nature,” Whorf would include the biological aspect of the
“human animal,” thereby accounting for biological
commonalities.
I have shown that it is possible to account for some
biological commonality in relativism. However, Pinker
would not want to stop there. The crucial difference between
Pinker’s views and the Standard Social Science Model is
not, as Pinker believes, that the SSSM is incompatible with
biological commonalities, or that it denies the existence of a
natural world outside of human discourse. Pinker takes the
discovery of biological commonalities in cognition a step
further to say that, not only are the material workings of our
minds universal, but our actual meanings and values are
universal. I see no evidence for this.
Pinker argues that language is an evolutionary
mechanism that humans developed in order to communicate.
Pinker does not see, however, that evolutionary mechanisms
are valueless. In order to extend his argument that language
is universal to other aspects of human behavior, Pinker
provides an exhaustive list, borrowed from Donald Brown in
Human Universals, that people have in common crossculturally. On the list are such abstract concepts as “law,”
“rights”, and “property,” as well as practices such as
“institutionalized marriage.” Just as every attempt to recreate
mentalese has resembled the language of the creator, this list
contains words that have connotations unique to Western
culture, perhaps even the culture of the US. The very idea of
“rights” is extremely difficult to communicate cross-

39
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culturally, presumably because this word as loaded with
values and meanings that could not possibly be universal.
Relativism in a Wittgensteinian sense is not at all
incompatible with the cognitivist project of discovering the
inner workings of the human mind. Suppose that we did in
fact discover a “language of thought” and tested it crossculturally, proving that everyone in the world thinks with a
Universal Grammar. What about this “language” makes it a
language in any way that is comparable to how we normally
view language? Wittgenstein argues that we can only
interpret an utterance as a language if we can also interpret
the speaker’s overall behavior. This is how Wittgenstein
arrives at his famous line, “If a lion could talk, we could not
understand him”40. Veena Das suggests that it is possible to
relate to people in ways that appeal to different levels of
understanding besides the surface meaning of a given
language game, without appealing to some transcendental
universal grammar that resides in each of us. We might also
ask the question, if we have a universal grammar, why do
we not understand each other better? We do not, after all,
understand the innermost thoughts and motivations of even
fellow participants in our most practiced language games.
This brings me to the next defense of a
Wittgensteinian view of relativism. Pinker posits that
language evolved for the specific purpose of
communication. Again, if this is the purpose of language,
why can we not communicate better than we do? Das talks
about what she considers the difference between speech and
voice. Speech, or utterance, is not all there is to language. In
dealing with world-shattering violence, Das explains that
people lose context to the point where the language game in
40
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which they operate no longer corresponds to the everyday
reality in which they live. People then seek to recover this
reality through everyday events and conversation, but as Das
finds in her fieldwork, the speech, or words uttered, do not
always correspond to the voice of her informants. Das finds
just as much meaning in silences, secrets, and omissions, as
she does in the language of her informants. These can find a
place in Wittgenstein’s language game, but not in Pinker’s
mentalese.
Not only is language not always effective for
communication, but why should we give primacy to
communication as the purpose of language? Pinker seems to
posit a value on language that does not implicitly exist in all
linguistic behavior. People learn to play games, tell jokes,
and write meaningless poetry. What, evolutionarily, would
motivate us to communicate in such ways? If direct
communication is the purpose of language, then why do we
not all speak in Aristotelian syllogisms? Whatever goes on
in the inner workings of our brains when we speak does not
seem to be directly related to the purpose of our linguistic
behavior in practice.
This linguistic behavior is related to the larger
cultural context of human behavior in a way that Pinker does
not fully address. When Pinker says, “Language is no more a
cultural invention than is upright posture” (18), he
unwittingly leaves the connection of language to other
learned behaviors open. Upright posture is not learned
through cultural immersion, but the meaning of sitting
upright at the dinner table is definitely a cultural symbol. As
humans, why should we necessarily separate the two –
evolution and culture – in our minds? Pinker describes a
practice in one culture of building sand around infants in
order to teach them to sit up straight. Clearly, in this culture,

23

people do not make a distinction between what is natural and
what is culture; neither is given primacy. In our culture, we
see the same principle at work in Chomsky’s discussion of
the prevalence of motherese. It is precisely because
evolutionary behaviors are learned along with cultural
behaviors that different cultural behaviors exist.
Language is no different from these other behaviors
in the sense that it is both innate and learned culturally.
Pinker says “Complex language is universal because
children actually reinvent it, generation after generation.”41
The evolutionary mechanism that allows children to
“reinvent” language is not incompatible but works alongside
the cultural behavior that surrounds language learning. As
children learn language, cultural symbols are encoded in a
way that is also biological. These symbols have causal
efficacy in the choices that people make because they
govern their worldview. This worldview is not something
that can be reduced to a universal grammar. The collective
worldview, which acts in relation to the abstract rules that
are applied in order to learn a language, is an essential
component to understanding language. It governs both the
subjects and the researcher who studies language and
culture. Perhaps this is why the only attempts at recreating
mentalese have resembled the language of the researcher.
For example, we cannot directly relate understanding
to a state of mind or an abstract principle. Instead,
understanding how to go on with a numerical series is
demonstrated in the ability that we show to continue
correctly with the series. In this argument, Wittgenstein
seeks to refute a Cartesian idea that the understanding is
41
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hidden away in the privacy of the individual mind, not a
modern idea about the cognitive nature of the mind.
However, it can be applied to Pinker’s idea of mentalese. I
do not think that Wittgenstein would reject the attempts that
cognitive scientists make to study the mind, but would resist
any attempt to equate the meaning of terms like
“understand’ with brain states rather than human practices.
Knowing a language, according to Pinker is
“knowing how to translate mentalese into strings of words
and vice versa”42. This is precisely where he departs from
Wittgenstein. I do not know mentalese, and I don’t know
anyone who does. There may be underlying mental
processes associated with everything from witty banter to
abstract concepts, but that does not mean that these mental
processes are these concepts. Wittgenstein studies language
as a part of the behavior of humans. When Wittgenstein
suggested the impossibility of opening the black box of the
human mind, he was referring primarily to the Cartesian
mind. This could also be applied to the present-day research
in cognitive science and the study of the biological processes
associated with language. Even if we did discover a
language of thought, this would not be a language that any
of us know, and it would not correspond to the subjective
way each of us sees the world. It would also not undermine
the assertion that the way one behaves in the world is
culturally dependent.

42
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Conclusion
When Pinker says, “Language is no more a cultural
invention than is upright posture”43, he is referring to only
one aspect of language and behavior. Upright posture, in the
sense of humans walking upright rather than crawling on all
fours, is not cultural. However, the meaning that we give to
upright posture is. The fact that that very phrase evokes for
me the image of a strict parent instructing a child to sit up
straight at the dinner table is a cultural fact, not an
evolutionary fact. Language may be an evolutionary
mechanism and, of course, biological commonalities in
humans limit the scope of cultural diversity. However, we
are equally limited by the linguistic system in which we
operate because we do not consciously think in mentalese;
we think in the linguistic system in which we were raised.
We can point out biological commonalities, but we will
always be limited in our communication of these
commonalities by the imperfect languages that we speak.
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